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Abstract
Background: Across the Africa region and beyond, the last decade has seen many countries introducing policies
aimed at reducing financial barriers to obstetric care. This article provides evidence of the cost and effects of
national policies focussed on improving financial access to caesarean and facility deliveries in Benin, Burkina Faso,
Mali and Morocco.
Methods: The study uses a comparative case study design with mixed methods, including realist evaluation
components. This article presents results across 14 different data collection tools, used in 4–6 research sites in each
of the four study countries over 2011-13. The methods included: document review; interviews with key informants;
analysis of secondary data; structured extraction from medical files; cross-sectional surveys of patients and staff;
interviews with patients and observation of care processes.
Results: The article finds that the policies have contributed to continued increases in skilled birth attendance and
caesarean sections and a narrowing of inequalities in all four countries, but these trends were already occurring so
a shift cannot be attributed solely to the policies. It finds a significant reduction in financial burdens on households
after the policy, suggesting that the financial protection objectives may have been met, at least in the short term,
although none achieved total exemption of targeted costs. Policies are domestically financed and are potentially
sustainable and efficient, and were relatively thoroughly implemented. Further, we find no evidence of negative
effects on technical quality of care, or of unintended negative effects on untargeted services.
Conclusions: We conclude that the policies were effective in meeting financial protection goals and probably
health and equity goals, at sustainable cost, but that a range of measures could increase their effectiveness and
equity. These include broadening the exempted package (especially for those countries which focused on
caesarean sections alone), better calibrated payments, clearer information on policies, better stewardship of the
local health system to deal with underlying systemic weaknesses, more robust implementation of exemptions for
indigents, and paying more attention to quality of care, especially for newborns.
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Résumé
Introduction: Ces dix dernières années de nombreux pays africains ont introduit des politiques visant à réduire les
barrières financières aux soins obstétricaux. Cet article fournit des informations sur les coûts et les effets des politiques
nationales axées sur l’amélioration de l’accès financier aux césariennes et plus largement aux accouchements au Bénin,
Burkina Faso, Mali et Maroc.
Méthodes: Une étude comparative d’études de cas, avec des composantes d’évaluation réaliste, a été réalisée en
utilisant des méthodes mixtes (quantitatives et qualitatives). Cet article présente les résultats de 14 outils de collecte
différents, utilisés dans 4 à 6 sites de recherche dans chacun des quatre pays de l’étude entre 2011 et 2013.
Résultats: L’étude a montré une augmentation croissante de l’assistance qualifiée à l’accouchement et du taux de
césariennes ainsi qu’une diminution des inégalités dans les quatre pays, mais ces tendances étaient déjà en cours avant
l’introduction des politiques d’exemption de sorte qu’un changement ne peut pas être attribué seulement à ces
dernières. Une réduction significative des charges financières sur les ménages - après l’introduction des politiques - a
été trouvée, ce qui suggère que les objectifs de protection financière ont été en partie remplis, au moins à court terme,
bien qu’aucun site n’ait réussi à maintenir une exonération totale des coûts ciblés. Dans les quatre pays les politiques
sont financées sur le budget national et donc potentiellement pérennes et ont été relativement bien mises enœuvre.
En outre, aucune preuve d’effets négatifs sur la qualité technique des soins ou sur les services non ciblés n’a été mise
en évidence.
Conclusions: Les politiques ont permis d’atteindre les objectifs de protection financière et probablement les objectifs
de santé et d’équité, à un coût pérenne, mais une série de mesures pourrait augmenter leur efficacité. Celles-ci
comprennent l’élargissement du paquet de soins exemptés (en particulier pour les pays ciblant uniquement les
césariennes), un système de paiement des hôpitaux mieux calibré, des informations plus claires sur les politiques,
une meilleure gestion du système de santé local pour faire face à des faiblesses systémiques sous-jacentes, et
plus d’attention à la qualité des soins, en particulier pour les nouveau-nés.
Background
In many African countries the burden of maternal and
early neonatal mortality remains extremely high, and de-
layed access to emergency obstetric care (EmOC) – es-
pecially caesarean section – is known to be a major
obstacle to progress. In particular, user fees for care are
prohibitively expensive for many households and prevent
women from seeking professional care when complica-
tions during pregnancy or delivery arise [1]. Those that
do access care, experience substantial difficulties paying
for hospital fees and often resort to selling assets, bor-
rowing from friends or family members or accruing new
debt [2]. Removing user fees is a current strategy to in-
crease access to and use of EmOC and has been intro-
duced in many African countries, including Western
and Northern Africa as a core policy to reduce maternal
and neonatal mortality [3].
While many countries are currently removing user fees
for delivery care and especially EmOC, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa (Meessen 2009), the current evidence
regarding the impact of this policy is not well developed.
In part this is because evaluation designs are not able to
capture all the necessary information for policy-makers
to make informed decisions. This article brings together
findings from complex evaluations by the FEMHealth
programme in four countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali
and Morocco. It aims to document the costs and im-
pacts of obstetric fee removal and reduction policies in a
holistic way. This includes analysis of policy drivers, fi-
nancing and sustainability, impact on the wider health
system as well as effects on quality of care, equity of ac-
cess and financial protection. Equity is examined across
each domain, but with particular emphasis on changing
utilisation of care, the financial benefits of the policy for
households, and understanding the extent to which the
policies address the existing barriers to deliveries and
caesareans in the study countries.
Background on national policies
Benin
The free caesarean policy was introduced on the 1st
April 2009. It applies to caesareans in all public and
private hospitals that offer emergency obstetric care
(but not to private-for-profit clinics). All women are
entitled to benefit and all areas of the country are cov-
ered, in theory. Hospitals are reimbursed 100,000 CFA
per caesarean to cover: check-up costs before medical
intervention, drugs, kits, surgery, blood, and hospitalization
for 7 days. The women pay for any costs arising before
hospitalization, or any other complication which may
arise during the hospitalization. Treatments for other
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complications which require surgery (such as uterine
rupture) are not free.
Burkina Faso
The national delivery subsidy policy in Burkina Faso
started in October 2006 for caesareans and April 2007
for deliveries and complications. It is more complex and
comprehensive than the policy in Benin. It operates in
all public health and some confessional facilities, and of-
fers an 80 % reduction of fees at health centre, district
hospital and referral hospital levels for: caesareans, com-
plicated deliveries and neonatal care. For normal deliver-
ies, there is an 80 % reduction of fees at health centres
and district hospitals, but only 60 % at tertiary hospitals
(to disincentivise by-passing). The policy covers all of
the in-facility costs (hospitalisation, medicine, surgical
kit, postoperative care, lab exams, medical act), as well
as referral transport costs. There is provision in theory
for additional support (full exemptions) for ‘indigents’
(the extreme poor) [4].
Mali
The free caesarean policy in Mali was introduced in
2005. It is applied nationally to all caesareans in the pub-
lic sector, and in theory covers all facility-based costs
(but not transport). In a three-way partition of costs,
families are intended to fund the journey into the health
centres, while communities fund the onward referral
transport costs, and the state covers the costs of service
provision, including hospitalisation, surgery, laboratory
tests, and treatment of complications such as pre-
eclampsia and ruptured uterus [5].
Morocco
The free delivery and caesarean policy in Morocco was
implemented nationwide from the start of 2009. It
covers normal and complicated deliveries in all public
facilities (including in theory university hospitals if the
woman is referred from a public facility), resuscitation,
transport to the appropriate level, and care for mother
and newborn as long as they stay in the facility (Minis-
terial circular of 11 December 2008). Miscarriage/
abortion, and ectopic pregnancy are not covered. The
Morocco policy is embedded in a wider national strat-
egy for safe motherhood, which includes upgrading of
facilities and skills, and also increasing awareness and
physical access.
Methods
As the policies had been introduced nationally, with-
out control areas, the project used a case study de-
sign, broadly based on the realist evaluation approach,
to understand differential implementation and effects
across different sites.
Realist evaluation considers that policies work (or not)
because actors make particular decisions in response to
the resources or opportunities that the policy provides. To
understand how the actors introduce change in a certain
context, a realist evaluation explores the context in which
the policy operates and the mechanisms that drive action.
Mechanisms can refer to psychological, social, cultural or
organisational drivers that explain why the actors
responded to the programme the way they did. Policy trig-
gers mechanisms only in specific context conditions: The
context influences the response of the actors: mechanisms
(and thus the programmes that trigger them) only work if
the context conditions are right - not every programme
works identically in every setting. The context-
mechanism-outcome (CMO) configuration is the heuristic
used in realist analysis, which results in answering the
question ‘Did the policy work, how, for whom, why and in
which conditions?’. The explanation of how the
programme has contributed to the observed results is
what realist evaluators call the programme theory. The
programme theory is not only the end product of a realist
evaluation, it is also its starting point (Fig. 1) [6, 7].
In this study, realist evaluation was applied in two ways.
First, we carried out realist case studies of policy adoption
and implementation. Second, we formulated programme
theories in the form of conceptual frameworks linking all
of the components of the evaluation programme at the
start, which helped to integrate results into country case
studies [8]. A set of core research questions were devel-
oped which outlined the main levels, domains and topics
that FEMHealth would seek to investigate. These form the
broad structure of this article, which flows from an ana-
lysis of the drivers behind the policies, their objectives and
formulation at the national level to analysis of how they
interacted with and impacted on district-level health sys-
tems, and, finally, their effects and effectiveness at com-
munity and household level (Fig. 1).
The findings presented in this paper are taken from 14
main data collection tools (Table 1), most of which were
used in all four study countries.
Within each country, districts were classified using
four variables: skilled attendance at delivery, caesarean
rate, poverty rate, and geographical access. The project
used a hierarchical cluster method to choose 4-6 dis-
tricts per country from different homogenous groups.
This article draws from a range of research papers and
country reports to provide comparative insights (fur-
ther details can be found at www.abdn.ac.uk/femhealth,
which also has reports on the individual country findings).
All protocols received in-country ethical approval – in
October 2011 in Burkina Faso, January 2012 in Morocco,
February 2012 in Benin, and July 2012 in Mali. In
addition to the approval from the ethics committee,
administrative authorization was requested and obtained
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from the regional health departments, districts, hospitals
and at national level in all four countries. The component
tools supported by thematic work teams were also ap-
proved by the ethics committees at the LSHTM and ITM.
Results
Context and drivers behind policies
One of the FEMHealth research aims was to understand
the origins of the policies in this region – why had so
many countries adopted similar policies over a short
period? What were the drivers behind this and how far
had they been influenced by one another and by inter-
national actors? These were addressed mainly through
research tools 1 and 2.
One set of drivers related to the recognition by
decision-makers that socio-economic factors were be-
hind low overall skilled birth attendance rates in Mali,
Burkina Faso and Morocco and large inequalities in all
four countries. In the early-mid 2000s, around the time
of their policy discussions and implementation, Benin,
Fig. 1 FEMHealth main research questions
Witter et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:123 Page 4 of 19
Table 1 Summary of FEMHealth research tools
Tool and findings section
to which it contributes
Level Key themes Approach
1 Observation grid in
meetings (B-SCALA)
Context and drivers
Actors at the national, regional
and international level
The ways/direction and content of the discussion
and presentation of the exemption policy
Key concepts: hierarchy, power, evidence, etc.
Participant observation in
policy and maternal health
meetings
Sample summary: Benin: 1 conference and 10 agency meetings
2 Interview guide with
national and regional
actors
Context and drivers; design
and implementation
Actors at the national, regional
and international level
Introduction of the policy
Perceptions of how the policy was put in place
and how it works
Actual implementation of the policy compared to
official documents
Elements of the political context necessary to
ensure the policy is implemented and is effective
Exchange between national, regional and
international actors policy on the policy
Structured discussion with
key informants
Number of informants interviewed in the following countries: Benin: 24; Morocco:12; Burkina Faso:23; International: 9
3 Policy document review
Design and implementation
National Review of published reports, analyses, press
releases and other documents related to the
policy at national level
Thematic analysis
4 Financial flows tracking
(FFT)
Financing of policies; facility
finances
National, regional, district, and
health facility level
Budgets & expenditure
Distribution per region and health services
3. Payment Schedule (and the kits/equipments
where necessary)
Consistency with the recorded activities
Consistency and adequacy of funds arriving at
the health facilities
A structured collection and
analysis of secondary data
Sites: Benin: national level; 6 regions; 5 districts; 7 hospitals
Burkina Faso: national level; 5 regions; 6 districts; 12 hospitals (1 CHU, 2 CHR, 4 CMA, 6 CSPS)
Morocco: national level; 6 districts; 8 hospitals (2 CHU, 2 CHR, 4 CHP)
Mali: national level; 4 regions; 8 hospitals
5 Costing
Financing of policies; facility
finances
Health facilities Unit cost of production of key maternal health
services: normal deliveries, complicated deliveries,
caesarean sections, antenatal care, postnatal care
Based on interviews and a
extraction of information from
sample of medical records
Sample: Benin: 7 hospitals in 5 districts; 1050 cases
Burkina Faso: 6 districts; 6 hospitals (4 CMA, 2 CHR); 443 cases
Morocco: No Costing tool
Mali:4 CHR; 4 HD; 2 CSREF; 2691 cases
6 Exit interviews (EI)
Household-level effects;
quality of care
Women who had a delivery,
their husband or relatives who
accompanied them at the
hospital
Costs for a given delivery inside and outside
hospitals Expenditure as a percentage of
household consumption Healthcare seeking
behaviour
Access to health facilities Perceptions of quality
of care
Structured questionnaire
Benin: 663 women in total interviewed; 294 with a caesarean; 294 women with a complicated delivery; 81 women with normal delivery
Burkina Faso:1609 women in total; 818 with a caesarean; 462 with complications; 316 with a normal delivery
Morocco: 973 women in total; 423 with complications; 442 with caesareans; 108 with normal deliveries
Mali: 589 women in total; 30 complicated deliveries; 345 caesareans; 188 normal deliveries; 26 without assistance/home delivery
7 Health worker survey
(HWIS)
Effects on human resources
Health workers Health workers and their workload
Working hours
Sources of income
Motivation at the workplace
Changes in the above factors, associated with the
policy
Perceptions of the policy
Structured questionnaire
(with some open questions)
Sample: Benin: 190 health workers; Burkina Faso: 130 health workers; Morocco: 187 health workers; Mali: 176 health workers
8 The Policy implementation
assessment (POLIAS)
Design and implementation
District
Hospitals
The start of the implementation of the policy
The service package covered by the policy
The proportion of facilities offering the service
package free of charge and on a permanent
basis
The actual geographical coverage
Structured discussion with
key informants;
Documentary review
(for triangulation purposes);
Routine data extraction
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Table 1 Summary of FEMHealth research tools (Continued)
Benin: 5 districts and 7 hospitals; Burkina Faso: 6 districts and 6 hospitals; Mali: 8 districts and 8 hospitals; Morocco: 6 districts and 6 hospitals
9 Policy Effects Mapping
study (POEM)
Effects on health systems
District Health management
team
Management team at the
hospital
Health workers
Governance
Provision of care
Human Resources
Financial resources
Drugs and equipment
Health Information System
Patients & the community
Interviews with key
informants
Documentary review
Routine data extraction
Check-list/observation
Benin: 85 interviews in 4 districts hospital, 2 private hospital,1 departmental hospital, 10 health centres
Burkina Faso: 57 interviews in 4 districts hospitals and 2 regional hospital and 12 health centres
Mali: 84 interviews in 4 regional hospitals, 4 district hospital and 16 health centres.
Morocco: 110 interviews in 5 districts hospital, 2 regional hospitals, 2 university hospital, 12 health centres
10 Realist case studies
Factors behind differential
implementation
Districts
hospitals
Actual implementation of the policy compared to
official documents
Perceptions of managers on the challenges
posed by the new policy
Mechanisms that explain the ownership and the
implementation of policy at the operational level.
Contextual elements necessary for the policy to
be effective
Interviews with key informants
Documentary review Routine
data extraction
Using data from other tools
for triangulation.
2 districts/country (excluding Mali); Benin: interviews from POEM; Burkina : interviews from POEM + 16 extra interviews to complete the analysis;
Morocco: interviews from POEM
11 Quantitative instrument on
near-miss, caesarean sec-
tions and the quality of
care
Impact on quality of care
Women and newborns The outcome of hospitalisation
The demographic characteristics
The reproductive history
The causes of complications
The near-miss definitions for women and
newborns
The indications for caesarean section
Delays in receiving care
Quality of care for caesarean section
Quality of care for all women
Medical records and records
of admitted women in the
maternity ward (normal
deliveries, near-miss,
caesarean sections)
Benin: 3361 deliveries; Burkina Faso: 1752 deliveries; Morocco: 3134 deliveries; Mali: 6386 deliveries
12 Quantitative analysis of
secondary data
Impact on utilisation;
inequities of access
National Utilisation of facility delivery care
Trends in caesarean section rates
Equity of access
Segmented regression analysis
of data from routine annual
statistics and nationally-
representative household
survey data
The model was specified as:
Yt = β0 + β1*time + β2*policy +
β3*postslope + εt
Where Yt is the outcome
variable (either facility delivery
or caesarean delivery) at time
t; time is a continuous
variable; policy is a dummy
variable indicating whether or
not the policy has been
implemented at time t; and
postslope is coded 0 up to the
last point before the
introduction of the policy and
coded sequentially from 1
thereafter Based on
recommendations by [22]
Benin: Demographic and Health Survey data for 1993–2011 (n = 36,375)
Burkina Faso: routine data published by the Ministry of Health for 1992, 1998 2000–2010; Demographic and Health Survey data
for 1988–2010 (n = 36,836)
Mali: Demographic and Health Survey data for 1993–2013 (n = 43,952)
Morocco: routine data published by the Ministry of Health for 1997–2011; Demographic and Health Survey data for 1987–1992,
1998–2011 (n = 16,679)
Missing data points in Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are due to lack of coverage due to gaps between DHS.
13 Observation guide in
health facilities
Health facilities Quality of care for all women
Quality of care for caesarean sections
Participant observations in
hospitals
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Burkina Faso and Mali had slightly lower maternal mor-
tality ratios compared to the sub-Saharan country aver-
age of 680 per 100,000 in 2005 (Table 2) [9]. All of these
ratios had shown declines in the ten years before the
policies were adopted, however not at a rate seen to be
able to reach the targets set by the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs). The Morocco maternal mortality
ratio at the time of the introduction of the policy was
considerably lower - 227/100,000 overall (rising to 267/
100,000 in rural areas).
The caesarean section rates at the time of policy
implementation in the three sub-Saharan countries
were below the WHO/UNICEF recommendations of
5–15 % for these settings. Wealthier women were more
likely to have caesarean sections than poorer women
[10]. In Morocco 16 % of women in the wealthiest
quintile had caesarean sections, while that percentage
already dropped to only 1.5 % among women in the sec-
ond wealthiest quintile [11] (Ministerial circular of 11
December 2008). Facility delivery rates were notable
across these countries in terms of a rural/urban divide –
women in rural areas tending less frequently to attend
facilities to deliver than those in urban areas. In terms of
overall rates for facility births, Benin had the highest rate
at 78 % in 2006, with Morocco following at 63 % in 2003–
2004, Burkina Faso at 57 % in 2003 and Mali at 49 % in
2006. All countries showed a higher rate of women attend-
ing ante-natal care consultation at a health facility than
delivering in facilities.
Our initial hypothesis that international actors might
have been behind the proliferation of related policies in
the West Africa region was not sustained: interviews
suggested that while international influences have been
important in shaping the global climate which permeates
the four case study countries, the decision-making and
elaboration of the policies were dominated by local fac-
tors. International actors may have lost some credibility
through changes in stance on issues like user fees, with
strong but changing messages over the past two decades.
“… I think word was getting out, around Africa, that
this policy [charging user fees] was mad… To remove
fees was good for the health sector and also brought
big political benefits. And I would say this whole thing
has been a politically driven process rather than a
technical one, and that remains to this day. […] I
think a lot of developing country governments now are
rather sceptical about the advice they’re getting from
development agencies, because in many respects, we
forced them into this in the first place, so for us to now
turn around and say ‘oh no, you shouldn’t do that, you
should remove them’ – I think that people are
sceptical about a lot of the advice that we are
providing.” – Consultant with international agencies,
global level (GL1)
West African countries that were once the heartland of
the Bamako Initiative (a cost-sharing initiative promoted
Table 1 Summary of FEMHealth research tools (Continued)
Impact on quality of care;
other household-level effects
Delays in receiving care
Communication between staff, patients and their
carers
Resources (human, materials, etc.)
Costs and payments for services
Benin : 4 weeks’ observation in 2 hospitals; Morocco :3 weeks’ observation in 2 sites
14 Interview guide with
women
Impact on quality of care;
other household-level effects
Health facilities/community
(women)
Perceptions of quality of care
Perceptions of costs related to hospital delivery
Awareness of free care
Structured discussion with
women after they return
home
Benin: 44 caesareans; 9 Near Miss; 9 “normal” deliveries; Morocco: 30 Near Miss
Table 2 Summary of maternal and neonatal health indicators by study country at start of policies
Benin Burkina Faso Mali Morocco
Sources DHS 2006 DHS 2003 DHS 2006 DHS 2003–2004
Maternal Mortality ratio 397/100,000 484/100,000 (DHS 1996) 464/100,000 227/100,000
Neonatal Mortality rate 32/1000 31/1000 46/1000 27/1000
% Skilled birth attendance rate 78 % 57 % 49 % 63 %
Coverage of antenatal care (at least one visit) 88 % 73 % 70 % 68 %
Coverage of antenatal care (at least four visits) 61 % 18 % 35 % 31 %
% Caesarean deliveries 4 % 0.7 % 1.6 % 5.4 %
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by international agencies since the 1980s) have been
amongst the most active in taking up selective exemptions
(which were seen as more acceptable and affordable than
broader approaches to fee removal). The emphasis on the
MDGs and, now, on universal health coverage have in-
fluenced the underlying discussions, and these free care
policies have to be seen in a context of proliferating ex-
emptions in the countries and region for many different
vulnerable groups and priority services, though variably
implemented. Shame at performing less well in relation
to neighbours was highlighted as a driving factor for
Morocco. Personal political leadership was seen as critical
in all contexts to enabling the policies to be realised – par-
ticularly for setting out a vision, and mobilising funds and
support. Evidence, while it was marshalled quite thoroughly
in two countries (Morocco and Burkina Faso), was used
more to assist with planning implementation details than in
propelling the original policy adoption itself. Affordability
was one factor behind the narrowing down of services
in Benin.
Design and Implementation of the policies
Table 3 summarises the services which were included
in each package and Table 4 the kinds of costs which
were covered.
All medical costs associated with the target services
within hospitals (and health centres in Burkina) were in-
cluded in principle in the package. None of the countries
covered transport to the first level facility, but all
claimed to cover onward referral transport, though in
practice managers acknowledged that patients often
paid. For Morocco, food within the hospital was covered,
but this was not the case for the other countries. Within
hospitals in each country, however, the package was
interpreted differently at the time of the study. Of 14
items which were mandated or implied by the policy in
Benin, the focal hospitals provided between 4 and 11
completely free, according to key informant interviews
with managers. For Morocco, 4–5 out of 6 items were
provided fully without charge within our study hospitals.
For Burkina Faso, few understood that newborn care or
post-abortion care were a part of the package, and there
was no free care provided for these services.
Management arrangements also varied: most policies
were managed by a national committee but in the case
of Benin, a dedicated autonomous agency was established
to manage the policy. These differences are reflected in
some of the research findings: for example, the centralised
model adopted by Benin may explain why there were no
discrepancies or major delays in reimbursement flows to
Table 3 Package of care covered by the exemption policies, all countries
Source: document review and key informant interviews
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facilities. However, there were also downsides, in terms of
a lack of involvement of the health zone in managing and
monitoring the policy (the chain of command went
straight from the agency to the hospitals, without involv-
ing district managers).
Supervision and evaluation was planned as a part of these
groups’ work but tended to be carried out less frequently
than envisioned (for example, in Mali the twice-yearly
supervision tended to be carried out once a year).
Financing
In all four countries, the policy is financed almost en-
tirely by the state, with a notable absence of direct donor
financial support, and indirect donor support for the
sector ranging from 0.5 % of public health spending in
Morocco to 36 % in Burkina Faso.
The scale of investment was hugely different across
the countries, with Morocco spending in the region of
24.5 million Euros on its overall action plan in 2011,
compared to 3.2 million Euros in Benin, and 415,000
Euros in Burkina Faso. Per delivery covered that equated
to 1.3 Euros for all kinds of deliveries (Burkina), 152
Euros per caesarean (Benin), and 797 Euros for all deliv-
eries combined (Morocco). Clearly, these differing scales
of investment should shape our expectation of results.
As a proportion of public health expenditure in 2011,
the policies absorbed around 2.5 % in Morocco, 3 % in
Benin and 3.5 % in Burkina Faso – not insignificant but
all potentially sustainable, if the policies are seen as
effective.
The three sub-Saharan African countries reimburse
retrospectively according to the number of services
Table 4 Type of costs covered per target group in the four FEMHealth countries
Source: document review and key informant interviews
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provided, using fixed payments per caesarean in Mali
and Benin, and reimbursement of actual variable costs
in Burkina Faso. For Morocco, hospital budgets have
been boosted to reflect rough estimates of revenue
likely to be lost due to the withdrawal of fees for de-
liveries, but these are set in advance, are not linked
to services delivered and have not increased over time
(indeed all subsidies for hospitals were unpaid in 2011).
Additional investments in staffing and improved access
and care were made in Morocco, which was not the case
for any of the other countries, where the budget for the
policies just covers the cost of facility reimbursements.
Management costs were limited in three countries. Only
Benin had an agency set up to operate the policy; in the
other three, the management was added to the existing
workload in the Ministry of Health. These features are
reflected in some of the findings on implementation and
effectiveness.
The payment systems also create specific incentives.
For Burkina Faso, decision to shift from fixed payments
per delivery to payment of actual costs means that there
is no incentive to over-provide or to skimp on quality,
but on the other hand, there is no surplus to reinvest
(the costs are just the variable ones, such as drugs and
supplies, so there is no contribution to general facility
running costs). In addition, the workload implied by bill-
ing by item is considerable, which is why this factor
caused discontent amongst the staff in Burkina Faso,
more than in any other country. By contrast, the fixed
tariff in Benin was found to overpay caesareans at all
types of hospital (relative to actual production costs but
also relative to previous payments from users). On the
positive side, examples of managers reinvesting the
surplus in improving overall services were found in
some sites in Benin. On the negative side, there was a
perception by some key informants in Benin that staff
were sometimes too eager to do a caesarean, rather
than letting women try for a normal delivery. In addition,
despite the generous payments, some hospitals continued
to make women pay for items which should have been free
(see below).
Health systems effects
Human resources
The only country to accompany its policy with a signifi-
cant increase in staff was Morocco, which increased the
deployment of midwives and hospital specialists as part
of its overall action plan. For other countries, there was
no evidence of increased numbers of staff in any large
measure, though in Benin, the additional resources pro-
vided by the policy allowed some local changes to improve
staffing. Table 5 shows that even after the introduction of
the fee exemption policies, working hours remained rea-
sonable across the countries, and productivity relatively
low, with around one patient seen per hour worked (in
Mali and Burkina Faso). While higher median working
hours are reported in Morocco, the outputs are not neces-
sarily higher – indeed for some categories, such as
doctors, even fewer patients seen are reported. WHO’s
Making Pregnancy Safer model suggested that 1 doctor is
required for around 1000 births, to provide emergency
intervention where there are complications before, during
and after delivery, while a midwife can provide care for
175 births per year. If these self-reported figures are accur-
ate and are scaled up to get annual estimates, midwives
are over-committed in all four countries, while doctors are
within norm in all countries. Analysis of routine data for
deliveries, divided by staff quota, produces lower ratios. In
part, this may be due to several staff contributing in differ-
ent ways to a single delivery and working on many differ-
ent services, but may also reflect over-reporting by staff.
However, workload (patients seen and deliveries
attended) are reported to have increased for three out
of four of the countries (Mali being the exception). In
Burkina Faso, the administrative workload imposed by
the policy was a particular concern. The consensus
was that the policies have not affected their remuner-
ation (as there are no direct financial incentives linked
to it for any of the staff in any of the countries).
Across all countries the majority of staff surveyed felt
positive about the wider effects of the policy, believing
that the policy has increased access to skilled birth at-
tendance, has benefited the poor, and has improved the
quality of care, including through perceived improve-
ments to drugs and supplies. This also impacts positively
on health worker working conditions and satisfaction in
some countries, like Burkina Faso and Mali.
Table 5 Average number of hours worked, patients seen and
deliveries done weekly per staff member, by professional
category, across countries
Country Professional
category
No. of hours
worked
(incl. on call)
No. of
patients seen
No. of
deliveries
performed
Burkina Faso Doctors 42 45 3
Midwives 44 44 6
Nurses 46 71 6
Morocco Doctors 70 36 0
Midwives 48 74 25
Nurses 40 20 8
Benin Doctors 48 28 6
Midwives 48 26 12
Nurses 48 16 4
Mali Doctors 40 33 4
Midwives 40 25 6
Nurses 36 27 3
Source: Health worker survey
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Facility finances
In Morocco, despite the increased budget to accompany
the implementation of the free caesarean and delivery pol-
icy, the general revenues of the health facilities have not
been affected positively. In 2011 and during the first half
of 2012, no financial resources were provided at all. This
has affected the financial reserves of the health facilities
that are still implementing the gratuity policy. For Benin,
the costing revealed that the current tariff is beneficial to
hospitals, paying considerably more than it costs to pro-
vide the service, though the surplus varies by type of hos-
pital. In addition, payments have been regular. For Mali,
the calculus is different, with the reimbursements not fully
covering costs of provision. In Burkina Faso, payments are
often delayed due to the difficulty of justifying expendi-
tures and do not include any operating costs beyond the
direct inputs needed for the service.
It might be expected that extra costs would be levied
from users in countries where facilities are poorly
rewarded for providing care, however analysis of house-
hold payments does not support this. In absolute terms,
women reported paying the largest amount overall for
caesareans in Benin (60 Euros on average), where the
payment for the policy is most generous. This suggests
that organisational culture and other factors play a role
in the levying of additional payments from users, rather
than actual financial need from the facility perspective.
IT systems
There has been no broad effect of the policies on health
information systems, either positive or negative. In Benin,
there has been a policy-related improvement in obstetric
information gathering, but this has not cascaded into
other areas of health information. In Burkina Faso, a spe-
cific system of collecting information on the policy was
put into place. Unfortunately the specific software crashed
several times, forcing the district managerial teams to
re-code all the individual forms of the beneficiaries dat-
ing back to the beginning of the policy implementation.
These IT bugs created a lot of frustration and delays in
reimbursement. As for Morocco, the wider information
system is unchanged and is generally seen as onerous
for health staff.
Drugs and supplies
All four countries used kits to support the implementation
of the policy, with varying results. The policy in Morocco
was accompanied by a large increase in kits, which meant
that drug supply improved, though in some places, kit
numbers were well in excess of need. For Burkina Faso,
drug supply also improved, but management of kits some-
times lacked transparency and stock-outs occasionally oc-
curred. In both Morocco and Burkina Faso, equipment
was reported by key informants to be lacking, with no
provision made to improve working conditions. In Benin,
the kit contents were perceived to be too generous at first,
leading to misuse, and then too restrictive, leading to costs
to users for items not included in the kits. In general, it
could be said that attention was paid to providing specific
drugs and items needed for obstetric care, but there was
no wider investment in the supply system and a continu-
ing focus on the use of kits, which may not be the most ef-
ficient method of organising supplies.
Management
The policies introduced threats and opportunities for
local managers, and examples were found of positive
and negative adaptation. Generally, managers had not
been much involved in the development of the policy,
and in many cases detailed guidance on how to imple-
ment it was lacking. Management teams were found to
have some leeway to interpret the policy. In some cases,
it was found that actors such as directors and specialists
used their power position to adapt the policy to their
own benefit, e.g. in some study sites of Benin or
Morocco, patients were still charged fees, because staff
were compensating for the free caesareans by charging
something else to the patient. These effects can be mod-
erated or avoided by capable management teams and ad-
equate supervision by programme managers, as seen in
other study sites of the same countries, where district
health managers and or hospital directors were positively
engaged with the policy implementation and the protec-
tion of service users.
In most study sites in Benin, Mali and Burkina Faso,
the management teams did not have a large absorption
capacity to take up the new tasks without additional re-
sources. If the reimbursements were late or inadequate,
the implementation halted. In Morocco, this was not the
case, as the capacity of the teams and the existing imple-
mentation infrastructure in terms of human resources,
facilities, and equipment was adequate to take up the
new patients.
Factors behind differential implementation
The analysis of divergent responses of different cadres
within our realist evaluation case studies indicated that
the adoption of the policy is explained in part by the con-
figuration of autonomy, decision space and motivation of
these actors and by organisational, institutional factors
and contextual factors.
Different responses were found in different sites within
the same country, indicating that beyond policy design
and national features, there is an inter-play of local
factors that influences whether the policy is blocked,
adopted or adapted. In general, the policy was well
adopted by the hospital managers. Nurses and midwives
in general perceived the policy as a positive one and
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adopted it by default. Doctors, and especially specialists,
were often found to use their power position to implement
the policy half-heartedly or to change it to their advantage.
At personal level, personal commitment and perception of
opportunity were found to play a role, while at organisa-
tional level, pressure of local communities, alignment with
local needs and enforcement by hierarchy were among the
factors that facilitated adoption and positive adaptation of
the policy. The role of ensuring public accountability, in
particular, was found to be underdeveloped or even not
mandated clearly. In any case, lack of effective stewardship
allowed faulty implementation processes to continue in
many of the sites.
The study confirmed that to implement the policy as
intended, managers require adequate margins of free-
dom in terms of health workforce management, but also
reliable supply of drugs and equipment, regular reim-
bursements and clear operational guidelines. In addition,
our studies found that at least as important is a strong
public service ethos (reflected in stewardship), which
contributes to the use of the above conducive decision
spaces and resources in the interest of the public. Finally,
we found that health staff are more likely to positively
adapt the policy to the local context if they are given sup-
portive supervision, either by the regional directorate or
by the agency responsible for the policy.
Impact on utilisation
In Benin, there was a positive trend in caesarean section
rates between 1993 to 2011 (p < 0.001), but we found no
evidence that the implementation of the exemption pol-
icy in 2009 significantly increased utilisation rates over
and above the existing secular trend (p = 0.7331) (Fig. 2).
In Burkina Faso, the overall rate was increasing in ab-
solute terms, it was doing so less rapidly post-2007
(Fig. 3), between 2002 and 2007 there was a 12 % rela-
tive increase each year, whereas between 2007 and 2010
there was a 6 % relative annual increase (p < 0.0001). For
caesareans, there was no evidence of a change in either
direction (0.4977) (Fig. 4).
In Mali, there was a significant positive trend in cae-
sarean section rates throughout the period 1993 to 2012
(p < 0.001) but we found no evidence that the imple-
mentation of the exemption policy in 2005 significantly
increased utilisation over and above the secular trend
(p = 0.4991) (Fig. 5).
For Morocco, there was no evidence of a change
post-2008 in facility delivery rates (p = 0.2972) (Fig. 6).
There was no evidence that the implementation of
the policy increased caesarean rates in Morocco (p =
0.6539) (Fig. 7).
It is evident overall that countries have made progress
over the past 15–20 years, and at best these policies may
have contributed to maintaining the momentum, but
there is no statistical evidence of that as yet. It is al-
most certainly too early to tell, as we have only 2–3
post-policy data points in each country, and the varying
implementation documented by the research also under-
lines the need to be cautious about assuming immediate
effectiveness of policies.
Furthermore, the Morocco caesarean section rate is
at a level where further increase would be unlikely to
lead to substantial additional reductions in maternal
mortality, and where there are rising concerns about
excess and unnecessary caesareans among certain
groups.
Fig. 2 Trends in caesarean section rates in Benin 1993 to 2011. Source: DHS data; red, dashed line represents the policy (2009)
Witter et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:123 Page 12 of 19
Impact on other (untargeted) services
The research looked in a systematic way for the impact
of the policies on untargeted services (such as general
medicine and paediatric services), in order to capture
any unintended positive or negative effects, but found
no major effects. Some positive effects of additional re-
sources introduced by the policies were documented
(e.g. in Morocco and Benin), as well as from wider util-
isation uptake in Burkina Faso, linked to the policy. On
the negative side, some examples were found where the
policy encouraged resources (such as staff ) to move
from untargeted to targeted services. More significantly,
in Benin, there was some evidence from trend analysis
in some sites of supply-induced demand for caesarean
sections, at the expense of normal deliveries. Trend ana-
lysis of provision of general medicine and paediatric
services in all countries and sites did not reveal any sys-
tematic evidence of distortions linked to the exemption
policies.
Impact on quality of care
Women’s perceptions of the overall quality of the ser-
vices, as reported in exit interviews, were generally high
or very high, and did not correlate well with technical
Fig. 3 Trends in facility delivery rates in Burkina Faso 1988 to 2010. Source: DHS data; red, dashed line represents the policy (2007)
Fig. 4 Trends in caesarean section rates in Burkina Faso 1988 to 2010. Source: DHS data; red, dashed line represents the policy (2007)
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quality of care scores (being highest in Burkina Faso,
where technical scores were lowest). The quality of neo-
natal care, measured by the number of omissions in
routine neonatal procedures, was very poor in some hos-
pitals in Benin and Burkina Faso, and generally poorer
than the quality of maternity care. Median delays in re-
ceiving caesarean sections were above the expected
threshold of 1 h in most hospitals (except in Morocco)
and were the highest in Benin hospitals, even though the
policy was designed to facilitate access to life saving
emergency surgery. Hospitals in Morocco performed
consistently better than hospitals in the other countries.
In observations and interviews in Benin and Morocco,
incidents of poor communication between health workers
and clients were noted, including lack of informed consent
for surgical care and poor bedside manners. In Benin,
while poor interpersonal relationships in maternity wards
had been documented in previous studies, in this project
these were attributed by several respondents to perverse
effects of the free caesarean policy.
Hospitals are still receiving many cases of near-miss,
particularly maternal near-miss, with hospital incidence
ranging from less than 2 % in Morocco to 14 % in Benin.
As cases of maternal near-miss are women who nearly
Fig. 5 Trends in caesarean section rates in Mali 1993 to 2012. Source: DHS data; red, dashed line represents the policy (2005)
Fig. 6 Trends in facility delivery rates in Morocco 1987 to 2010. Source: DHS data; red, dashed line represents the policy (2008)
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died and were saved in extremis, there is still a lot of pro-
gress to be made in the organization of the health services
in order to reduce the burden of several morbidities and
mortality in the focus countries. A high burden of peri-
natal mortality and neonatal near miss was also observed
across all facilities.
Our key hypotheses included that hospitals/districts with
lower user fees cost may register shorter delays and fewer
adverse events because women may arrive earlier in facil-
ities; but that on the other hand, an increase in volume of
patients, if not met with an increase in human resources,
might lead to a deterioration of the quality of maternity and
neonatal care. In Burkina Faso, the hospitals where the
costs paid by households were the lowest were also the
hospitals with the best technical quality of care as mea-
sured by their low omission scores, smaller delays and
their low case fatality rate for severe complications.
However, limited relationships exist between the omis-
sion and implementation score in Benin, implying that
quality of the care provided was affected by many factors,
which may be quite independent from policies designed to
increased access.
Other household-level effects and influencers
Awareness of the policies was relatively low at the time
of the study, ranging from 20 % amongst women who
had delivered in Benin to 53 % in Mali (but much lower
in some districts). As these interviews were conducted
with women who had used services and had already de-
livered, wider awareness can be assumed to have been
even lower at the time. Detailed knowledge of entitle-
ments was very low. Clearly, if policies are to influence
care-seeking a greater communication effort is needed,
especially for poorer and more remote women (aware-
ness tended to rise for higher quintiles).
Delay in seeking care and health seeking behaviour
In general, median reported delays in deciding to leave
home, arriving at facilities and being seen were accept-
able, although there was a large variation between sites
and by type of delivery, and a wide range within the re-
sponses in general. The median delay in leaving the
house was rather high in Benin. In addition, it is import-
ant to remember that those interviewed represent those
who were able to access care, and these are often not
the most disadvantaged women. Perceptions of need, the
availability of transport and the availability of the key de-
cision-maker (who varied by site) emerge as significant.
In-depth interviews with users suggest an appreciation
of the policy and that the policy did address some of the
key barriers to access. However, it did not necessarily
change health seeking behaviour. In Morocco, interviews
showed that the choice of location for deliveries was
made largely according to expected comfort, care and
monitoring (for example, at home), and reassessed in
cases where outside help was decided to be necessary as
a matter of urgency. Transport was a key barrier. At the
hospital, the absence of a doctor, the gaps in surveillance,
inadequate resources, and tedious negotiation process to
receive the desired care were all aspects known and antici-
pated by women when considering their recourse to care.
In Benin, there was also no evidence from the interviews
or observations that women modified their decision to
seek out skilled professionals at birth due to the policy.
While the policy was appreciated and the costs of caesar-
ean sections were considered to be more affordable than
Fig. 7 Trends in caesarean section rates in Morocco 1987 to 2010. Source: DHS data; red, dashed line represents the policy (2009)
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in the past, the policy does not erase the fear of the caesar-
ean section as a medical procedure and the threat of loss
of life. Decisions about where to give birth were based on
perceived medical need, hospital reputation, convenience
of access and past delivery experiences.
Inequities of access
In all three countries for which there was recent house-
hold survey data (i.e. excluding Mali), the relative in-
equity between the poorest and the richest had declined
over time (in that there have been bigger gains among
the poorest). The policy may have contributed to this
but this is a longer term trend, and one which followed
to some extent from the fact that richer women already
had high coverage. In all three countries there remains
substantial inequity in utilisation of care.
In all three countries there is a larger relative differ-
ence in utilisation of caesareans, compared to institu-
tional deliveries Inequity is however difficult to interpret
with caesareans because the ideal is not 100 % use, so
the relative gap is not always meaningful. For example,
in Morocco we have clear evidence of unnecessary cae-
sareans taking place among the richest as the rate is over
25 % [12]. Without data on the reasons for the caesarean
sections it is hard to assess if lifesaving needs are being
met or not. Burkina Faso’s situation is quite different:
the caesarean rate is only just reaching above 5 %, even
in the wealthiest group.
In Morocco, the top quintile and to some extent the
fourth quintile make substantial and growing use of the
private sector for deliveries. This alleviates the public fi-
nance burden of the policy as the rich self-select out of
its use to some extent.
Financial impact for households
In relation to the amounts that should have been paid
by households under the policies, we found that they are
paying excessive amounts in all countries, though the
excess payments are relatively low for Morocco (2 % of
their total payment for caesareans and 6 % for normal
deliveries), which indicates a relatively effective imple-
mentation of the policy (Tables 6 and 7). By contrast, in
Mali, 49 % of the household payment is excessive. Inter-
mediate proportions of 13 % (for Benin) and 17 % (for
Burkina) were found for caesarean sections. The absolute
amounts paid in Benin were higher than for Burkina, as
the overall payments were higher.
Patterns of payment across quintiles and across rural
and urban areas varied (Table 8). Large proportions of
the households in all settings and quintiles incurred
catastrophic costs, even under the current policies (and
a higher proportion in rural than urban areas in all four
countries).
Certain costs, including transport, the expenses of
companions, care of newborn (in some countries), tip-
ping of health workers and supplementary drugs remain
a burden. Lack of clarity on charging can also reduce the
predictability of costs and cause anger and confusion for
women and their families.
Between 0 and 35 % (depending on the site) of house-
holds surveyed had been unable to make the requisite
payments, with those in lower quintiles more likely to
report this than in higher. In general households coped
by using savings and getting help from family and
friends, but some had to sell productive assets such as
land to cover the bills. Very few had health insurance
membership and in general, health insurance was not a
protective mechanism for most households, as it is pro-
rich in its distribution.
Looking at the difference between recorded payments
prior to the policies and average payments now, house-
holds have made a substantial financial gain. In Burkina
Faso, there was a reduction of 71 % for deliveries of all
kinds. In Morocco, the gain was lower for normal deliv-
eries (62 %), compared to 92 % for caesareans. The esti-
mated saving for caesareans in Benin was in the region
of 74 %, compared to 78 % for Mali.
Discussion and conclusions
The main overall study limitations were an absence of
baseline indicators for many variables, which limited our
ability to trace policy impact directly; gaps in secondary
data for a number of areas; and civil conflict in Mali,
which meant that only some of the research tools could
be completed there. In order to study effects, FEM-
Health used previous studies, where available, and time
trend analysis [12, 13]. We also used cross-sectional ana-
lysis to understand how differences in outcomes might
Table 6 Total payment per caesarean section (in Euros) and % as proportion of household monthly expenditure
HH Expenditure per month Excess amount paid per CS Total payment for CS Excess as % of total
payment
Payment per CS as % of median
household expenditure
Burkina Faso 61.89 6.25 36 17 58
Morocco 178.26 1.44 63.2 2 35
Benin 90.89 8.74 64.54 14 71
Mali 100.90 23.92 49.2 49 49
Source: Exit interviews
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link to differences in implementation of the policies. Our
overall approach was to construct a plausible narrative of
policy introduction, implementation and effects, based on
a triangulation of different sources and methods.
The policies in Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali and Morocco
were strong national initiatives, which aimed to improve
maternal health and to increase access to obstetric care. On
one level, the evaluation produces inconclusive results: we
observe positive trends in relation to skilled birth attend-
ance and caesarean sections and a narrowing of inequalities
in all three countries for which recent data is available but
cannot attribute these to the policies. There is no significant
change in the trends that coincides with the introduction of
the policies. It is likely that they have contributed to the on-
going trend, but this is only speculative.
The heavy emphasis of these policies on caesarean sec-
tions (in two out of four countries) has been problematic
in a number of ways: caesareans can save lives, but even
if utilisation increases it is not easy to know if the med-
ically indicated women have received care. Furthermore,
caesareans do not address main causes of maternal
deaths as post-partum hemorrhage, complications of
abortion, severe malaria, etc. [14]. Moreover, the use of
caesareans is heavily skewed to the rich and to urban
areas, meaning that the benefits of the funding will al-
most automatically be biased in favour of the rich. It is
an intervention which in some contexts needs boosting,
but in other contexts (or for some groups) needs con-
trolling. It can be induced by suppliers and patients for
the wrong reasons, and carries medical risks. While
policies to reduce the costs of caesareans (which are
high cost, potentially catastrophic events from a house-
holds perspective) can provide real financial benefits to
households, as these have done, from a public health
perspective a wider policy covering a range of life-
threatening obstetric complications and also the pathway
to them (facility deliveries) is preferable. Morocco and
Burkina Faso illustrate this approach.
One of the underlying objectives was to reduce the bur-
den of this essential service on households, and thereby
change delivery care seeking behaviour. The overall evi-
dence suggests a significant reduction in household pay-
ments for the targeted services, ranging from 53 % for
caesareans in Benin to 92 % for caesareans in Morocco.
The financial protection objective therefore seems to have
been met effectively. This is consistent with recent ex-
tended cost-effectiveness modelling in countries like
Ethiopia [15]. However, even in relation to the package of
care which was supposed to be covered, households contin-
ued to pay sums which amounted to a small proportion of
their overall expenditure in Morocco, intermediate in
Burkina and Benin and the large majority in Mali. A signifi-
cant proportion (0–35 %, depending on site) was unable to
pay. Moreover, women reported a lack of certainty about
what they should pay or not which not only increases finan-
cial problems but also clouds their relationship with pro-
viders. This indicates that there is plenty of scope to
increase the financial protection offered by the policies.
Furthermore, we found that while financial barriers
are significant and are connected to many other barriers
(physical, cultural etc.), on their own their reduction
does not change behaviour, unless it is connected with a
positive shift in other aspects, such as perception of
quality and responsiveness. Policies on financial access
therefore need to be designed with improvements to
these other facets in mind, as an integral part of their
Table 7 Total Payment per normal delivery in Burkina Faso and Morocco (in Euros) and % as proportion of monthly household
expenditure
HH Expenditure per
month (EUR)
Excess amount
paid per ND (EUR)
Total payment for
ND (EUR)
Excess as % of total
payment
Payment per normal delivery
as % median HH expenditure
Burkina Faso 61.89 0.61 16.23 4 26
Morocco 178.26 3.12 48.73 6 27
Source: Exit interviews
Note: Excess refers to payments for items which are explicitly included in the exempted package of care (or over the basic tariff, in the case of Burkina Faso)
Total payment refers to the total cost of a caesarean (costs paid inside the hospital including gifts to personnel, costs of prescribed drugs bought either at the
hospital or private pharmacy and the costs of carers)
Table 8 Total expenditure per deliverya as % of household expenditure, by rural/urban location and by quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Average payment (Euros)
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Burkina Faso 56 71 115 78 35 124 40 60 23 60 50
Morocco 52 54 44 58 35 32 31 36 23 69 49
Mali 147 64 49 50 89 62 32 37 34 52 50
Benin 139 170 - 124 124 163 106 170 133 101 83
Source: Exit Interview
aTotal payment refers to the total cost of delivery (costs paid inside the hospital incl. gifts to personnel, costs of prescribed drugs bought either at the hospital or
private pharmacy, the costs of carers and transport costs)
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design. Behaviour change also has to be measured over a
longer period, as habits in relation to significant services
such as delivery change slowly.
Looking at a simple comparison of the funds spent by
government on the policies versus the estimated gains
made by households gives another insight into the value-
for-money question. In all three countries for which we
have unit cost data (this is missing in Morocco), the aver-
age expenditure per delivery was lower than the average
gain per household with a delivery. There is therefore a
net gain, which probably reflects the payment system and
the fact that facilities are providing care without fully re-
covering their costs. If they are able to do this and still
provide adequate care without passing additional costs to
women, then the policy is leveraging an efficiency gain in
the health system.
Comparing these country experiences with those
documented in other countries with similar exemption
policies [16–20], we can highlight some strengths. For
example:
 The policies have been relatively thoroughly
implemented: despite some gaps and lapses, the
policies have been put into effect in a serious way
 They have not been affected by budget shortfalls,
which undermined the effectiveness of similar
policies in countries like Ghana [21]
 They have, in some cases, like Morocco’s, been
accompanied by the additional supply-side
improvements which are required to meet the
additional demands
 There is an underlying support for them, and not
only from beneficiaries: most actors within the
health system (health district managers, hospital
management teams, specialists, nurses and
midwives) reacted positively to the policy in
interviews. The policy was generally considered to
be relevant and important
 They have achieved substantial reductions in
household payments, which will over time
contribute to poverty reduction and reduced
inequalities of access
However, there are also some weaknesses. These include:
 A package of care which in some cases (Mali and to
a lesser extent Benin given its utilisation rates) will
not address all of the main causes of maternal and
early neonatal morbidity and mortality, and whose
impact on these can therefore only be expected to
be modest, even if well implemented
 Poorly calibrated provider payments for those
using fixed payments, which either over-incentivise
(in the case of Benin) or under-fund (in the case of
Mali). Both of these result in perverse effects and stem
in part from poorly understood cost structures
 Lack of clear and well disseminated operating
documents, which enable staff and clients to be
clear about how the policy will work and what is
covered by it
 Too limited attention to the quality of care offered
by the facilities covered by the policy; for newborns
in particular it has been found to be sub-standard
 Lack of involvement in most cases of managers,
staff and communities in developing and
monitoring the policy in order to increase
ownership and control abuse
 No policy has completely reduced the officially
exempted costs to zero; although magnitudes of
unwarranted payments vary in scale, all countries
need to more effectively regulate providers and stop
illicit payments from patients
 By their very design, the policies are unable to
address some of the main barriers faced by women,
such as the inability to physically access health care.
Additional actions are needed to ensure that benefits
can be equitable
Wider impacts, positive and negative, intended and
unintended, are also to be taken into account in coming
to an overall judgement about these policies. We have
found a range of these but they vary by context and sug-
gest a variety of outcomes can be expected from these
policies, depending on their features but also the context
and the institutional and organisational frameworks into
which they are introduced. This complexity means that
no one simple answer to the overall evaluation question
can be produced for all settings.
A range of equity findings have emerged – some positive,
like the closing of gaps in coverage – but documenting a
continuing set of barriers which discriminate against poor
and vulnerable women. These include lack of awareness,
lack of real access to facilities, socio-cultural barriers, con-
tinuing residual financial barriers, negative staff attitudes
and poor implementation of policies, which mean, for ex-
ample, that elements which are meant to protect the poor-
est, like the full exemption for the poorest in Burkina Faso,
are not funded and put into practice. All of these need to
be addressed to ensure that the benefits of these universal
policies are distributed according to need.
All four countries show continued large unmet needs
for emergency obstetric care for almost all groups (with
the exception of better off households in Morocco). For
example, the richest have been around 5–6 times more
likely to have a caesarean section than the poorest for
the whole period studied in Mali. However, even among
the richest in the most recent household survey, the
caesarean section rate is only 6 %, which is only just
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entering acceptable levels. Among the poorest there’s a
huge unmet need for EMOC.
In addition to the weaknesses of the policies them-
selves, there are underlying systemic weaknesses that
undermine policy effectiveness and fairness, such as lack
of effective stewardship at the local level, inadequate
communication over the policy with staff and communi-
ties, staffing which favours urban and well-connected
areas, drugs supply and distribution systems that are not
reliable, and poor provider-patient relationships in some
areas. Improving these will be key to making these and
similar policies operate effectively and in a pro-poor
manner.
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